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Aristotle and Howells: Old and New Rules of
Storytelling
William Comfort Anderson
Doane College
Crete, Nebraska

I

n Criticism and Fiction, William Dean Howells quotes
the assertion by Armando Palacio Valdéz that “[i]t is
entirely false that the great romantic, symbolic, or classic
poets modified nature; such as they expressed her they felt
her; and in this view they are as much realists as ourselves”
(34).1 In echoing this statement, Howells expanded the
tradition of Realism outside its usual academic chronological
constraint. This paper will demonstrate that he was correct
in doing so. Realism may have begun as a negative reaction
to the preceding Sentimentalist period, but in that reaction
there were old ideas rejuvenated as well as new ideologies
created. Howells’ polite political and social pragmatism
may be unique, but his favorite method of conveying them,
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through fiction, hardly strays from a set of guidelines more
than two millennia old: Aristotle’s Poetics. The Poetics was
also a somewhat reactionary work; it was, in part, a response
to those who placed the epic storytelling form above that of
the tragedy. The epic was the domain of the great hero, the
outlandish adventure, and the episodic plotline. These same
characteristics are the hallmark of Sentimental literature.
Howells and Aristotle reacted negatively to the same literary characteristics, and in doing so, they created amazingly
similar philosophies of storytelling.
To examine the relationship between Howells and
Aristotle, the critic is provided some convenient tools. Not
only did Howells write fiction but also editorialized at length
about the state of the literary community, his thoughts on Realism and Romanticism, and what makes a piece of writing
good in general. The Rise of Silas Lapham and Criticism and
Fiction, his most representative novel and his most comprehensive critical work, will both be used in this study. Taking
Criticism and Fiction as Howells’ Realism Manifesto, The
Rise of Silas Lapham as a demonstration of his principles,
and comparing those generally with the Poetics, I will
demonstrate the similarity between Howells’ rules of writing (both explicit and implicit) and Aristotle’s ancient rules.
Bringing to light the similarities in their philosophies of writing will also lend credence to Edwin Cady’s suggestion that,
given a definition of Realism based on literary characteristics
rather than time period, “we could justify the nineteenth
century realists outside and beyond the conventions of their
time and thought— forward into the present and backward as

far as we know art” (The Light 22)2 , and also to the broader
idea that the development of writing in general is not a direct
evolution from Greek stage plays to narrative poetry to novels, but rather a cyclical progression that is based, not on the
changes of tekhnê (medium), but on the changing opinion
concerning the universal laws of good storytelling.
A Tragic Novel
Before examining the specific ideas concerning
storytelling common to both Aristotle and Howells, the more
abstract idea of quality must be analyzed. How do Aristotle’s
ideas of the basic form and usefulness of storytelling compare to those of Howells? Aristotle explains that the tragedy,
comedy, epic, and often music are pleasurable because of
mimêsis (3). Mimêsis, as translated by Malcolm Heath, is
imitation of an object or emotion. It has also been translated
as ‘representation’ (Heath xiii). A prose description of a
flower is an imitation/representation of that flower; a painted
portrait is an imitation/representation of the subject. Mimêsis
is inherently pleasurable, and therefore the creation and recognition of a piece of artwork is pleasurable and an end unto
itself. Howells examines mimêsis in Criticism and Fiction,
in an imagined statement from a layman to a scientist:
I see that you are looking at a grasshopper
there which you have found in the grass,
and I suppose you intend to describe it. Now
don’t waste your time and sin against culture
that way. I’ve got a grasshopper here, which
has been evolved at considerable pains and
expense out of the grasshopper in general;
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in fact, it’s a type. It is made up of wire and
card-board, very prettily painted in a conventional tint, and it’s perfectly indestructible. It isn’t very much like a real grasshopper, but it’s a great deal nicer, and it’s served
to represent the notion of a grasshopper ever
since man emerged from barbarism. (13)
Based on this sardonic passage, we can draw our first
connection between Aristotle and Howells. Aristotle calls
the pleasure of the creation and recognition of mimêsis
a trait that is rooted in humanity’s basic instincts (Heath
xiv). Howells says that it is “illusion in which the truth of
art resides” (Criticism 39). However, Howells is strict in
defining what ought to be imitated. This is a key difference
between Aristotle and Howells. Aristotle was open to the
idea of outlandish objects in stories as long as they made
sense in the context of the fictional world of the narrative:
For example, Aristotle did not believe that
the theology built into traditional Greek
myths was true; but (unlike some earlier
philosophers, including Plato) he had no objection to poetic plots based on them. (Heath
xiv-xv)
In contrast, Howells’ fictional worlds were always
built in such a way that they were directly and literally
referential to universal experience. Howells placed great
importance on revealing the familiar in his stories, which is
a rule that applies to his symbols as well as his plots. This
is not to say that none of Howells’ symbols was referential

to the narrative, but only that the fictional world revealed
in the narrative always imitated the universally experienced
real world (Carter 132-6). For example, in The Rise of Silas
Lapham, the new house is both a part of Silas’ wealth and
good standing as well as a symbol for all of it. Its destruction
is simultaneously the symbol of and one of the largest causes
of his fall to financial ruin.
Then there is the largest symbol of the novel, the
paint. Silas establishes early the link between his family and
his paint; in the first chapter, he reveals his Persis brand,
named after his wife. The paint is described as “his heart’s
blood” (92) and his god (42). Silas also says:
I never saw anything so very sacred about
a big rock, along a river or in a pasture that
it wouldn’t do to put mineral paint on it in
three colors […] I aint agoing to stand up
for every big ugly rock I come across, as if
we were all a set of dumn Druids. I say the
landscape was made for man, and not man
for the landscape. (13-4)
Sämi Ludwig cites that passage in explaining:
For Lapham, there is no spiritual essence
(‘dumn Druids’) in nature as such that precedes human culture, but the two are functionally intertwined […]. The paint and its
representation are not primarily mimetic, but
much rather exteriorized prosthetic devices
of human cognition and thus parts of parts of
nature. (106)
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The idea of painting over the landscape is less of a symbol
in the Romantic sense of the word— an object or action
that stands for another— than an action that is an obvious
manifestation of an otherwise unobservable trait. The trait
revealed is Silas’ earthiness and farmer’s sense of naturalistic
belonging that excludes him from a society which considers
those ideas uncouth and backwards. Because painting over
the landscape is a vulgar idea, and Silas is his paint (and his
move to upper society is his version of ‘painting over the
landscape’), he is rejected by society with the same disgust
that they have for his paint-illustrated philosophy.
With the connection between Howells and his paint
made explicit (over and over again), it is now part of the universal experience of any reader. A Romantic would have left
the connection between the paint and its owner implicit, and
Howells would have called any symbolism built on that relationship distasteful. It is only because of that strong, explicit
connection that Howells allows himself more latitude in his
paint symbolism than with his other symbols. For example,
Silas’ comment that he wants to “live to see at least three
generations of his descendants gilded with mineral paint”
(80) implies, according to Jeff Todd, that “he does not think
the wealth from his paint will make him better, only that it
will appear so” (21). Also, Todd points out, “[a]s paint must
be tested by fire to gain strength, Lapham becomes stronger
after his financial ruin, culminated by the house fire” (22).
Thus, symbols are either commonly found objects
or objects that are self-referential in the novel; in either
case, for anyone reading the novel, they are universally

experienced. This mimêsis of the universal is another way
of defining Edwin Cady’s term “common vision,” which
he uses to define Realism. Common vision is based on the
following idea:
There is some, presently obscure, relationship between the experience a reader gets
(or can make) from “non-art,” what we call
“life,” and the experience he derives from
art[…]. It might therefore be possible to
propose a positive and general definition
of realism as representing the art-variety of
a “real” order of non-art experience— an
order, that is, which even those who held to
deeply opposed temperamental and metaphysical notions of ultimate reality might
agree to accept as “real” in some useful and
common, even though minimal, sense.
(The Light 18-9)
This common vision of shared experience is Aristotle’s concept of mimêsis limited to generally experienced objects and
emotions.
Mimêsis is a universal concept in art, but the specific storytelling rules of the Poetics apply only to tragedy.
To continue in comparing the Poetics to Howells’ rules, it
must first be demonstrated that Howells was a tragic novelist. Aristotle states in the Poetics that tragedy is the best form
of storytelling and lists as his evidence the fact that tragedy
is best-loved by those people with the best taste. However,
some of Howells’ readers have used different classifications.
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The Rise of Silas Lapham has been called a comedy of manners, a comedy, and a morality play; all of these definitions
are, to some extent, mutually contradictory (Manierre 359;
Dimock 85; Cox 127; Seelye 55). These categorizations are
also based on singular aspects of a complex novel. In fact,
the categorizations are all true in part; it is a funny, sad story
of harsh realism mixed with romance that is based on both a
rise and a fall. In light of these many facets of the novel, it is
impossible to categorize it definitively. For the purposes of
this paper, it is necessary only to answer this question: Does
The Rise of Silas Lapham meet Aristotle’s criteria of tragedy
such that his storytelling rules can be applied to the study
of this novel? Is it, at least in part, an Aristotelian tragedy?
Aristotle wrote:
Tragedy is an imitation [mimêsis] of an
action that is admirable, complete and possesses magnitude; in language made pleasurable, each of its species separated in different parts; performed by actors, not through
narration; effecting through pity and fear the
purification of such emotions [katharsis].
(10)
The length of the novel and the correct constituent parts of
the plot will be examined later. Aristotle’s four remaining
criteria are that it imitates admirable action; it is written with
pleasurable language; it invokes pity and fear, followed by
katharsis3; and it is performed by actors rather than through
narration.

Before entering into a more detailed examination,
Howells’ oft-quoted statement that “[o]ur novelists, therefore, concern themselves with the more smiling aspects of
life” (Criticism 62) must be analyzed. After all, a tragedy
certainly cannot be made up entirely of smiling aspects.
Cady offers an explanation. He notes that the phrase “the
smiling aspects of life” is often taken out of context. Within
context, Howells is saying that it is impossible to write a
Realist Russian novel in America because the standard of
living is so much higher (Cady “A note” 160-1). Howells
writes: “Whatever their deserts, very few American novelists
have been led out to be shot, or finally exiled to the rigors of
a winter at Duluth […]” (Criticism 62). He continues:
Our novelists, therefore, concern themselves with the more smiling aspects of life,
which are the more American, and seek the
universal in the individual rather than the
social interests. It is worth while, even at the
risk of being called commonplace, to be true
to our well-to-do actualities. (Criticism 62).
Howells was not claiming that there was no tragedy in
America or that American novelists must not portray tragedy
but only that Americans must not portray tragedy that they
were not actually experiencing. It is also worth noting, as
James Woodress did, that Howells wrote the “smiling aspects
passage” before the Haymarket affair and before discovering
the writings of Tolstoy, which were both likely to affect his
outlook greatly (242).
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The Rise of Silas Lapham portrays realistic American tragedy. There is no wailing in the streets, but there is
emotional damage, disgust, and a broken heart. The moral
rise of Silas Lapham is accompanied by a concurrent financial downfall that leaves the Lapham family in bankruptcy
and forces them back to the farm that they had left years
ago. It ends well enough for the characters, but it would be
something of a stretch to say that the novel ends happily.
Indeed, the events leading up to the subtle but unsettling
denouement certainly invoke fear and pity: pity for Silas at
the Corey dinner, fear that Irene will find out what she inevitably must, fear for the marriage of Silas and Persis when
suspicions concerning Zerrilla begin to surface, and finally
pity for Silas once again when he forces himself to make the
ethically correct choice when the only possible result is his
and his family’s social collapse. Aristotle contends that stories are most tragic when talent is squelched (Heath xxi); in
this case, Silas squelches his shrewd business sense and his
financial security with his conscience— his Realistic tragic
flaw. The actions leading up to the Laphams’ final downfall
are brought on by the difficult ethical decisions that Silas has
to make. Whether or not he makes the right decisions is a
question left unanswered, but the fact that Silas’ conscience
prompts him to choose the difficult solution makes his actions admirable. The ending is kathartic by virtue of the
stasis of the Laphams’ final situation, and can be described
as no more than bittersweet.
It is established that The Rise of Silas Lapham
meets the criteria of mimêsis of admirable action and the

provocation of fear and pity. The criterion of “language
made pleasurable” is too subjective to prove, but it can
be argued that the witty repartee of the Coreys combined
with the colloquialism of the Laphams provides a rich
combination of dialogue. Aristotle expands on his criterion
of pleasurable speech with the phrase “each of its species
separated in different parts” (10). This is parenthetically
clarified as meaning “that some parts are composed in verse
alone; others by contrast make use of song” (10). It would
be easy to ignore this criterion based on the fact that we
are examining a medium that would be completely foreign
to Aristotle. However, it is simple and appropriate to draw
another parallel here and say that the separation of verse and
song is like the separation of dialogue and narration. This is
accomplished mainly through the form of the novel— there
are quotation marks around direct discourse and not around
narration. However, other than the use of this convention,
this is one aspect of Aristotle’s philosophy with which
Howells does not completely agree. Janet Holmgren McKay
notes that the ownership of opinions in the novel is not
always clear:
When the Laphams show up at the Corey
dinner party without Penelope, the narrator
tells us that “Robert Chase, the painter, had
not come, and Mrs. James Bellingham was
not there, so that the table really balanced
better without Penelope; but Mrs. Lapham
could not know this, and did not deserve to
know it” [167]. The final critical evaluation
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may reflect Mrs. Corey’s opinion, but the
narrator does not specifically exclude himself from sharing it. (97-8)
But this is a minor infraction of Aristotle’s rule, taking into
consideration the translation of Aristotle’s text, the transposition of the rules between tekhnê, and the clear distinction of
all direct discourse.
The fourth and last criterion— the performance of
the piece by actors rather than through narration— admittedly presents a problem. Aristotle wrote the Poetics long before
the novel was even in the early stages of evolution, and so it
was assumed in his culture that dramatic storytelling was an
art of the stage. Rather than ignoring this criterion, however,
it can be, without excessive assumption, adapted to apply to
modern media. The key to comparing the stage to the page is
to note their common methods of communication: physical
movement and dialogue. A novel that extensively uses those
methods to tell its story can be examined with rules originally meant for the stage. The Rise of Silas Lapham applies.
McKay notes:
Characters speak for themselves in Silas
Lapham and express their opinions of one
another. The novel contains much less
indirectly reported discourse than either
The Bostonians or Huck Finn. The narrator allows himself only limited access to
his characters’ thoughts and then frequently
qualifies this access with a ‘perhaps’ or a
‘probably.’ (94-5)

McKay also makes note of the fact that Twain admired this
style of writing and, in considering the objective narrator,
likened the description to “stage directions” (35). With an
objective narrator who provides only “stage directions”
and a plot that unfolds almost entirely through directly
related discourse, Silas is as close to the theater as a novel
can be. The reader cannot see Silas pacing the room as one
could with a more standard third-person narrator; the only
communication comes directly (though inadvertently) from
Silas: “[…] by and by his wife heard him begin walking
up and down, and the rest of the night she lay awake and
listened to him walking up and down” (291). The reader does
not know of Tom’s love for Penelope until he confesses it.
When Irene finds out about the mistake, rather than plunging
into a dramatic, introspective fit of anger and sorrow,
Howells has her physically respond by dropping her wood
shaving in Penelope’s lap (215). The effect of this limited
narration is a viewpoint so objective, yet so immediate and
tactile, that the reader feels as if he is watching the story
unfold on a stage. Howells’ story may be comic at times,
but that does not make it a comedy. Using the criteria of the
Poetics, it is arguable that The Rise of Silas Lapham is an
Aristotelian tragedy.
Plot
It is now time to return to a previous assumption:
the length of the story is correct. Aristotle defines the correct
magnitude as being small enough that the audience will remain interested but large enough to demonstrate the causality
of a change from good to bad fortune (Heath xxv). Aristotle
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said that if a work were to grow too large, it would become
episodic. He wrote:
[O]ne should not compose a tragedy out of
a body of material which would serve for an
epic— by which I mean one that contains a
multiplicity of stories (for example, if one
were to use the whole plot of The Iliad).
In epic, because of its length, every part
is given the appropriate magnitude; but in
plays the result is quite contrary to one’s
expectation. (30)
Howells also found this to be true, and proposed that plays
were not the only potential victims of poorly crafted magnitude:
A big book is necessarily a group of episodes more or less loosely connected by
a thread of narrative, and there seems no
reason why this thread must always be supplied. Each episode may be quite distinct, or
it may be one of a connected group; the final
effect will be the truth of each episode, not
from the size of the group. (Criticism 68)
Aristotle contended that the best form for narrative
writing is the three-act structure— beginning, middle, and
end:
A beginning is that which itself does not
follow necessarily from anything else, but
some second thing naturally exists or occurs
after it. Conversely, an end is that which

does itself naturally follow from something
else, either necessarily or in general, but
there is nothing else after it. A middle is that
which itself comes after something else,
and some other thing comes after it. Wellconstructed plots should therefore not begin
or end at any arbitrary point, but should
employ the stated forms. (13-4)
The first chapter of The Rise of Silas Lapham depicts,
through Silas’ own dialogue, his finding the mineral ore on
the farm. The act of giving an interview illustrates the beginning of what one would expect to be his social rise; this is an
opening chapter that needs no prelude. The end is undeniably
the end; the Laphams are back on the farm, and although
they are no longer in debt, the reader is quite sure that they
will stay where they are. The fact that the middle comes between the beginning and the end does not need to be argued.
The placement of the constituent parts is correct. However,
the more complex issue of a plot composed of events that
follow each other “either necessarily or in general” needs
to be studied. This phrase indicates that events need to be
linked by causality; either an event usually follows the
previous event in the real world or an event must follow the
previous event by its very nature. Aristotle expands on this
idea later in the Poetics:
Just as in other imitative arts the imitation is
unified if it imitates a single object, so too
the plot, as imitation of an action, should
imitate a single unified, action, and one
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that is also a whole. So the structure of the
various sections of the events must be such
that the transpositions or removal of any one
section dislocates and changes the whole.
If the presence or absence of something has
no discernible effect, it is not a part of the
whole. It is also clear from what has been
said that the function of the poet is not to
say what has happened, but to say the kind
of thing that would happen, i.e. what is
possible in accordance with probability or
necessity. (15-6)
The probability of one event following another depends on
Cady’s concept of literature according to common vision,
or the mimêsis of universal experience. Aristotle is saying
exactly what Howells demonstrates in his novel: art must
emulate real life; specifically, the consequences of everyday
actions must be mirrored by the same consequences in art
when similar actions are performed. The other causal link,
necessity, is a one-hundred-percent probability— one event
forces another to happen. Howells was explicit about the
needs for these causal links between events:
[A]ll I have to say is that the ‘power’ to
dazzle with strange incidents, to entertain
with complicated plots and impossible
characters, now belongs to some hundreds
of writers in Europe; while there are not
much above a dozen who know how to
interest with the ordinary events of life, and

with the portrayal of characters truly human.
If the former is talent, it must be owned that
it is much commoner than the latter[…]. If
we are to rate novelists according to their
fecundity, or the riches of their invention,
we must put Alexander Dumas above
Cervantes. Cervantes wrote a novel with
the simplest plot, without belying much or
little the natural and logical course of events.
This novel, which was called Don Quixote,
is perhaps the greatest work of human wit.
(Criticism and Fiction 35-6)
The belief in preserving “the natural and logical course
of events” is demonstrated in The Rise of Silas Lapham.
Frances Albert Berces notes that the sequence of events in
the novel “achieve[s] a realistic cause and effect continuity
[…]” (201). The wide-ranging causal fabric is further
examined by Wai-Chee Dimock, who describes Silas as
caught in a causal universe that expands and contracts as
social problems such as the love triangle become more
complicated and then are alleviated. The comprehensive
subplots, such as those involving Roger and Zerrilla, serve to
further expand the causal universe (Dimock 70-7). William
Wasserstrom observes that Silas recognizes this: “For Silas
himself says that his first wrong act of business, the Rogers
affair, is best conceived as the first brick in a row of bricks
which tumble one after another. ‘It wasn’t in the nature of
things that they could be stopped till the last brick went’”
(84).
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The Rise of Silas Lapham satisfies all of Aristotle’s
basic rules, as those rules have been translated to apply to
the novel. However, there are rules beyond these basic ones.
Necessary and probable events, unity, universality, and correct magnitude form only a simple plot. Aristotle contends
that a complex plot is preferable and defines a complex plot
as one that incorporates reversal, recognition, or suffering.4
The Rise of Silas Lapham also meets Aristotle’s criteria of
complex plot structure.
Aristotle defines a reversal as “a change to the opposite in the actions being performed as stated— and this,
as we have been saying, in accordance with probability or
necessity” (18). Heath explains that this is not just a tragic
change in fortune, which is also a characteristic of simple
tragedies, but “an astonishing inversion of the expected
outcome of some action” (xxx). For example, Tom’s love
for Penelope and Silas’ relationship with Zerrilla are both
inversions of expectation. Reversal goes hand in hand with
recognition, which is the following:
[a] change from ignorance to knowledge,
disclosing either a close relationship or
enmity, on the part of people marked out
for good or bad fortune. Recognition is best
when it occurs simultaneously with a reversal, like the one in Oedipus. (18-9)
Aristotle lists several different types of recognition: the least
artistic is recognition of objects, the inartistic recognition by
unmotivated confession, recognition by memory, recognition
by inference, recognition by false inference, and the best sort

of recognition, recognition “which arises out of the actual
course of events, where the emotional impact is achieved
through events that are probable” (26-7). An example of the
best sort of recognition can be found in and after the Corey
dinner party. Berces notes:
Lapham’s decision to attend the dinner is the
logical outgrowth of his mounting aspirations. At the dinner he is challenged time
and again by circumstances to realize that
his demeanor and dinner habits are inadequate. His ability to be honest with himself
thereafter develops out of his recognition
that while drunk he was indeed himself,
stripped of pretense, his untutored social
qualities exaggerated by drink, and he was
not valued. (201)
This recognition comes the next day, when Silas can once
again control himself. This time, reversal follows recognition; Silas, rather than maintaining his embarrassment-fed
bombast, grovels to Tom, which leads to another reversal of
expectation: Tom’s proposition to Penelope.
The third complex plot trait is suffering, which is “an
action that involves destruction or pain” (19). The examples
that Aristotle gives are all physical, such as “deaths in full
view, extreme agony, woundings and so on” (19), so it must
be assumed that the obvious emotional pain that the majority
of the characters suffer does not apply. However, because
only one of the three complex plot traits is needed to classify
the work as complex, by virtue of reversal and recognition
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The Rise of Silas Lapham can be called the “best” (20) sort
of tragedy.
Character
Aristotle defines plot as the most important part of
tragedy, and a survey of Howells’ titles shows that he agrees.
With the exception of Mrs. Johnson, Annie Kilburn, and
Mrs. Farrell, Howells’ fiction eschews the titling convention
of naming a work after the main character in favor of something related to plot. Silas Lapham is important to Howells
because of his moral rise and the actions that form the plot
that constitute that rise— hence, The Rise of Silas Lapham
(Barton 163). However, there can be no argument that the
vehicle of the actions— the character— is deeply entwined
with the plot and the second most important characteristic of
storytelling.
Aristotle held that if a character were depicted with
an inappropriate morality, the audience would be either
bored or disgusted. He describes the ideal protagonist as “the
sort of person who is not outstanding in moral excellence or
justice; on the other hand, the change to bad fortune which
he undergoes is not due to any moral defect or depravity, but
to an error of some kind” (21). This error, Heath explains, is
called hamartia in the original text. “It includes errors made
in ignorance or through misjudgment; but it will also include
moral errors of a kind which do not imply wickedness”
(xxxiii). Silas meets all the criteria: he is morally decent, but
with an immoral decision in his past (buying out Rogers)
that, by Silas’ own admission, was the first “brick” in a row
of thereafter necessary events.

But had Silas really treated Rogers unfairly? A modern reader will ask that question, and Patrick Dooley claims
that a nineteenth century reader would have almost certainly
asked it as well. Dooley states that ‘business ethics’ was
something of a contradictory term in the nineteenth century,
and caveat emptor was the motto of those involved in speculative enterprise (“Nineteenth Century” 80). So, in making
things “right” with Rogers, is Silas doing what is morally
required or are his actions supererogatory?
This question is the key to an important concept
of Aristotelian character creation. Aristotle presents the
reader of the Poetics with a conundrum: “Since tragedy is
an imitation of people better than we are, one should imitate
good portrait-painters. In rendering the individual form,
they paint people as they are, but make them better-looking”
(25). The character cannot be too good; his fall to ruin
would disgust the audience, and yet the audience must look
up to him. He must be both aligned with and above regular
morality. Howells accomplishes this through two different
means: by having Silas travel through different stages of
morality and by making the moral questions difficult enough
that most readers, even from an objective viewpoint, will
second-guess themselves about the correct decision. There
is more than the question as to whether or not Silas’ original
sin against Rogers was actually wrong; indeed, that single
question spurs a multitude of others, involving Silas’ new
obligation to Rogers and his duty to his family versus his
duty to the business world, and by extension, society at large.
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It is important to note Dooley’s observation that
further calls into question Silas’ moral standing. A bit of
arithmetic shows that, even if he were to accept the deal offered by Rogers and the English party, it would still not be
enough money to settle his debts. It may have been that the
decision not to accept was a purely a moral one. Or, if there
was temptation to be weathered, it is likely that the fact that
the immoral decision would not save Silas gave him an easy
way out (“Ethical Exegesis” 382-5). The reader is then left
with a qualified admiration for Silas— no doubt the decision was hard, and he did the right thing, but how hard was
it for him? Yet, Dooley observes again, Rogers is not the last
temptation that Silas has to suffer. He has the chance to make
a deal with the West Virginians, but he chases them away by
disclosing his financial situation (“Ethical Exegesis” 385-6).
Depending on which moralist one asked, this action might
have been either necessary or supererogatory.
There is further evidence to dispel the theory that
Silas’ actions were externally controlled. He has control of
Rogers every single time they meet, no matter how much
pressure Silas is under and no matter what Rogers says (as
evidenced by his contradicting Rogers’ wishes at every
step). He could easily bail himself out with help from the
West Virginians by exercising the morality of the typical
nineteenth-century businessman. However, he cannot. Silas
reflects Howells’ vision of the American hero. Howells wrote
of America as a country “which likes a good conscience so
much that it prefers unconsciousness to a bad one,” and that
belief is reflected in his writing (qtd. in Jones 99). Because

“a variety of qualifiers, especially ethical theories, renders
the same action moral (and required) or supererogatory (and
optional)” (Dooley “Ethical Exegesis” 387), Howells, in
creating these complicated ethical questions, found a way
to create a character that was, by the end of the novel, both
aligned with and above the moral standard.
The question of “goodness” is only one of Aristotle’s
four aspects of a well-invented character; the other three are
appropriateness, likeness, and consistency. The quality of
goodness having been previously examined, the last three
now demand attention. The second trait is “appropriateness.”
It was Aristotle’s belief that a character should not behave in
a way that was out of keeping for the general social group
to which he or she belongs. Heath explains that Aristotle applied this rule only to persons of low status (xliv-xlv). During Aristotle’s time, this would have meant that a woman or
a servant should not be depicted as clever or courageous. In
the case of The Rise of Silas Lapham, the Laphams are kept
in their place; although they have money, they do not belong
in the wealthy caste of society. In social terms, it is known
that they belong on a farm. The Laphams combine Aristotle’s
rules successfully in a way that he probably never imagined:
they are a family of low status and, appropriately, they end
up where they belong; but they are also the focus and the
heroes of the story.
With the aspect of “likeness,” we must examine once
again the dual nature of character that Aristotle demands. All
Aristotle says about likeness is that “this is not the same as
making character good and appropriate, as had already been
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stated” (24). Heath interprets this rule as a guide to the characteristic duality spoken of earlier— characters should be
like the audience, but better. He returns to Aristotle’s portrait
analogy:
There is therefore a combination of likeness and idealization in portraiture; a painter
might keep Cromwell’s warts, but make
them seem less ugly than they really are.
In the same way characters can be made
better than we are while still retaining some
imperfections of character; in this respect
they should be like us, despite the element
of idealization. This would agree with the
requirement in chapter 13 that tragic characters should be virtuous, but not outstandingly so. They are like us, in that they fall short
of the moral perfection whose downfall we
would find outrageous; but they still tend to
the better rather than the worse. (xlv)
Silas makes almost impossibly difficult decisions by the
end of the book, but he is forced into that position by his
own hamartia involving Rogers and by the character flaw of
ostentatiousness. Berces notes the following:
[Silas’] error in judgment is classically Aristotelian. The same common sense that leads
him to be secretly charitable to the parasitic
Moll Millon drives him also to be openly excessive in his social and material aspirations.

He has not distinguished between genuine
and false self-reliant pride. (201)
This is an easy mistake, as “every situation has encouraged
him to believe that by climbing the social ladder he is just
being his own man” (Berces 201), so although the flaw is
obvious, it is also understandable and easily forgivable.
The fourth and last necessary character trait is
“consistency.” Aristotle says that “even if the subject of the
imitation is inconsistent, and that is the kind of character that
is presupposed, it should nevertheless be consistently inconsistent” (24). Heath observes:
This obviously follows from the requirement of necessary or probable connection. If
someone in a tragedy acts inconsistently and
unpredictably, then one cannot say that what
they do follows necessarily or probably on
what has gone before. (xlv)
Although Silas’ moral condition improves by the end of
the novel, the character was consistent in the way that he
responded to plot events. His proud nature propelled him to
build a new house, to attend the Corey dinner party, and to
react the way he did to the realization that he did not belong
where he wanted to be. He may be a changed man by the end
of the novel, but not without necessity. Throughout his rise
and fall, he is always Silas Lapham.
The Poetics was written, in part, as a rebuttal against
those who said that the epic was the greatest of storytelling
forms (Heath liv-lxi). More than two millennia later, Howells
began a career as an author and editor by fighting the trends

58

59

of Sentimentalism, which share the epic traits of outlandish
heroes, otherworldly romances, and episodic plots containing
events that are neither necessary nor probable (Aristotle 17).
As Aristotle fought the authors of epics, so Howells fought
the Sentimentalists by applying Aristotle’s tenets to the
novel.5 Many of Aristotle’s rules sound like the Realist rules
which Howells used in his fiction and championed in his
editorials: depicting characters whose actions are appropriate
to their social position, creating a complicated and almost
dualistic morality that is both at and above the level of the
audience, maintaining logical consequence in plot events,
and maintaining correct magnitude to avoid episodic structure. Howells wrote that “fiction is now a finer art than it has
ever been hitherto, and more nearly meets the requirements
of the infallible standard. I have hopes of real usefulness in
it, because it is at last building on the only sure foundation”
(Howells Criticism 86). Howells may have changed the face
of literature, but his foundation was not wholly new; his
criticism and his fiction invoke classical standards. The new
rules of writing that Howells championed are, in fact, some
of the oldest.

Notes
1

2
3

4

Though many would regard Sentimentalism as an
aspect of Romanticism, Howells is more forgiving
of the Romantic than he is of the Sentimental. This
excerpt from his review “A She Hamlet” hints at
the distinction he draws: “The Hamlet of Fechter,
which rose ghostlike out of the gulf of the past, and
cloudily possessed the stage where the Hamlet of
Mme. Bernhardt was figuring, was called a romantic Hamlet thirty years ago; and so it was in being a
break from the classic Hamlets of the Anglo-American theatre. It was romantic as Shakespeare himself
was romantic, in an elder sense of the word, and not
romanticistic as Dumas was romanticistic. It was,
therefore, the most realistic Hamlet ever yet seen,
because the most naturally poetic” (Literature 134).
Specifically, the definition Cady refers to is his own,
based on the idea of “common vision.”
Heath explains katharsis as the process that “gets rid
of an emotional excess and thus leaves the emotion
in a more balanced state, mitigating the tendency
to feel it inappropriately.” It is pleasurable because
“[f]rom an Aristotelian point of view any process
that restores one to a natural or healthy state is
pleasurable” (Heath xxxix-xl).
It should be noted that the complex plot is not the
same as the complicated plot that Howells derides
in Criticism and Fiction. The plots he describes as
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5

complicated “dazzle with strangle incidents” (35),
which implies that they have no logical causality.
For another look at how The Rise of Silas Lapham
was a criticism of the Sentimental mindset, read
Brenda Murphy’s essay “Howells and the Popular
Story Paradigm: Reading Silas Lapham’s Proairetic
Code” in American Literary Realism 21.2.
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